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THE RELIGIOUS, THE SECULAR, AND THE
ANTITHETICAL
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS °
Since the Enlightenment, religious belief and secular knowledge in the West have been at loggerheads. The Enlightenment
aimed to rid Western society of ideological superstitions, especially
religious ones. Although the relationship between belief and knowledge during the last three centuries has been complex and variable,
it has almost always been adversarial. Religion and secularism
have settled at opposite poles on a continuum between subjectivity
(belief) and objectivity (knowledge). In most of the intellectual confrontations between these two adversaries, knowledge has prevailed
in a way that has discredited belief, so that belief was steadily relocated from the center of Western politics to its periphery. This has
resulted in a contemporary public culture in the United States that is
largely secular, despite an American private life in which religion
has remained vital and vibrant.1
The eclipse of belief by knowledge was momentous.
Nevertheless, the result of the confrontation may be less significant
than how the confrontation came about. The institutional hegemony
of the medieval church, with its theological correlate of salvation
through church-administered sacraments, was drastically diminished by a Reformation Protestantism that emphasized individual
faith and salvation. Both Catholicism and Protestantism were opposed by the Enlightenment claim that Truth can be objectively uncovered by reason and empiricism. This claim is now under sustained attack by what might loosely be called the post-modern critique, which maintains that even scientific objectivity is impossible, and no way of knowing is naturally privileged. From
Catholicism to Protestantism to naturalism to post-modernism, the
pattern has remained the same. An ideological challenger has
sought to expose its predecessor ideology as a fraud, as power mas* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. J.D., University of
Southern California; B.A., Brigham Young University. Ted Blumoff, Cole
Durham, and Jim Gordon reviewed an earlier version of this paper and made
many helpful comments. I am also indebted to Dr. Steven Sondrup of the
Comparative Literature Department of Brigham Young University, who introduced me to the work of Hazard Adams. Mark Peterson provided indispensable research assistance. Portions of this paper are drawn from a chapter
in my forthcoming book, co-authored with Roger Hendrix, entitled CHOOSING
THE DREAM: THE FUTURE OF

RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE, to be

published by Greenwood Press in 1991.
1. Gedicks, Toward a ConstitutionalJurisprudence of Religious Group
Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 99, 100 & n.3 (1989) (citing various sources).
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querading as Truth. Having done so, the challenger ideology has
assumed the mantle of naturalness and inevitability that comes
with social predominance, only to be itself exposed as mere power
in disguise by a subsequent critique. Throughout the last 500 years,
ideologies have come and gone, but power has remained.
It is not surprising, then, that contemporary scholarship, both
within legal academia and without, is full of deconstructive and
critical arguments to the effect that power is all there is.2 Yet,
imagining that power is the only structure which organizes the
world is deeply disquieting, triggering nihilistic images of human
life as illusion, fraud, and absurdity. As Ruth Anna Putnam has
observed, "Knowledge and morality without foundation give us a
sense of vertigo."' Perhaps this is why conventional legal
scholarship, often chooses to dismiss deconstruction and the Critical
Legal Studies movement rather than to engage them.' The
proliferation of doctrinal balancing tests continues unabated in the
law reviews, bloodied perhaps, but unbowed.
If the post-modern critique is valid, if power is really all there
is, then ignorance and fear will not send it away. Only by confronting ideas can a person test their validity and learn to live with
them, if she must. In any event, "the challenge cannot be evaded."5
One of the major figures in American literary criticism,
Hazard Adams, has met the post-modern challenge by admitting the
force of its epistemological critique without accepting its nihilistic
implications. Addressing the question how a work of literature
enters the Western canon of "great works," Adams observes that
"canonizing" a text is not a literary but a power concept.
Contemporary critics tend to expose formally neutral literary criteria as disguised power criteria. However, such critics often substitute their own power criteria against those of the dominant ideol2. See, e.g., R.

RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xiii

(1989)

[hereinafter R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY] ("socialization, and thus historical circumstance, goes all the way down-there is nothing "beneath" socialization or
prior to history which is definatory of the human"); M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 318 (1988) ("Human
experience consists of connectedness and autonomy, love and hate, toleration
of others and anger at their differences from an ever-changing 'us.' Neither the
liberal tradition nor the republican one can accommodate the aspects of
experience that the other takes as central. Critique is all there is.").
3. Putnam, Creating Facts and Values, 60 PHIL. 187, 195 (1985)
[hereinafter R. Putnam].
4. See, e.g., Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222
(1984) (arguing that CLS scholars do not belong in law schools). Notables in
the literary world who have chosen to engage (rather than to dismiss) the
deconstructive critique include George Steiner, see G. STEINER, REAL
PRESENCES (1989), and John Ellis, see J. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION
(1989).
5. G. STEINER, supra note 4, at 134.
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ogy. For example, Adams criticizes those feminists who protest the
undeniable white, male, and elitist character of the traditional literary canon while championing the work of other authors for the
apparent principal reason that they are Third World females of
color. The power criteria of whiteness, maleness, and class are thus
challenged by criteria that are different and perhaps even opposite,
but which are nevertheless power criteria in their own right.
Adams's principal thesis is that authentic literary criteria can
emerge only in an "antithetical" or "visionary" mode-i.e., in a
critical stance that attempts to withdraw from all oppositions of
power without either negating those oppositions or generating power
criteria itself.'
I propose to examine the contemporary American conflict between religion and secularism in public life through the lens of this
insight into the nature of power in critical discourse. I will argue
that the general exclusion of religious belief from the discourse of
American public life is merely the latest turn in the historical relationship of church and state which extends back to the Middle Ages.'
Philosophically, the exclusion of religion from public life is
grounded on the Enlightenment distinction between subject and object which correlates to the contemporary distinction between belief
and knowledge.' Conventional liberal wisdom suggests that secularism fulfilled the Enlightenment dream of politics without desperate and violent ideological conflict.9 I will suggest, however, that
the secular society is not the destination of Western history, but
merely another ideological waystation.' What could be beyond
secularism? Contemporary political dialogue, and American public
life in general, must assume a tone like Adams's visionary antithetical voice if the United States is ever to develop a post-secular
public culture that does not merely exchange secular power for religious power in measuring the legitimacy of public discourse. In
other words, public discourse in a post-secular, post-modern society
must evolve from the current view that secularism is the departure
point and limit on public debate, and it must accomplish this without substituting in its place religion as the new departure point and
6. Adams, Canons: Literary Criteria/Power Criteria, 14 CRITICAL
748 (1988) (hereinafter Adams, Canons]. For a recent collection of
Adams's work (including the foregoing essay), see H. ADAMS, ANTITHETICAL
INQUIRY

ESSAYS IN LITERARY CRITICISM AND LIBERAL EDUCATION (1990).

7. See imfra Part I. Like all historical relationships, that between church
and state has been highly complex, and the historical account set forth in Part I
unavoidably ignores much of this complexity for the sake of brevity and clarity.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See, e.g.,

W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976); Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DE PAUL L. REV.

1083 (1990).
10. See infra Part III.
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limit. I will close, then, with a closer examination of Adams's
antithetical voice and its implications for both belief and
knowledge in American public life.11

I
Up to the 16th century, religion and government in the West
were unified, each representing a different aspect of the same divine authority. Post-Reformation Europe from the 16th to the 18th
centuries saw an institutional (but not a social or political) disengagement of religion and government brought on by both theological and political imperatives. Following the American revolution
on into the 19th and early 20th centuries, the United States moved
away from sectarian public discourse in search of a language that
would unify the cultural and religious diversity created by increased education, industrialization, and immigration. By the
1930s, however, the United States had inherited the full legacy of the
Enlightenment. The pragmatic move away from sectarian language in service to cultural and political unity was transformed
into a normative preference of secularism among intellectual elites
as the language of progress and learning.
A
Secularism began with the distillation of two separate spheres of
institutional influence within society as a result of the
Reformation. One sphere became the domain of the spiritual, ruled
by the church; the other the domain of the secular, ruled by the state.
At this time, the word "secular" merely described property previously owned by the church which had been legally transferred to
individuals or government for nonecclesiastical uses.' The
meaning of the word eventually broadened into a general description of all institutions that were not related to the church. Prior to
the Reformation, however, the concepts "religious" and "secular"
did not exist as descriptions of fundamentally different aspects of
society. Although there clearly was tension and conflict in the relations between church and state during this time, the state was not
considered to be nonreligious. Both church and state were part of the
Christian foundation upon which medieval society was built.'
11. See infra PartIV.

12. H. KUNG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN 26-27 (1976).
13. Most historians believe that the concept of separate realms of religious and secular authority did not begin to take shape until the 15th century.
See, e.g., G. SABINE,

A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 226, 355 (rev. ed. 1950).

See also H. KUNG, supra note 12, at 556. Harold Berman argues that the separation of church and state took conceptual form as the result of the church's
emergence as a visible and separate corporate structure following the estab(continued)
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There were two forces that encouraged the institutional separation
of church and state into fundamentally different social spheres of
the religious and the secular; one force was theological, the other political.
The church of the Middle Ages had fallen heir to the classical
idea that "the purpose of the state was to establish and conserve a
complete and finished program of life." 4 It was theologically
committed to the spiritual leadership of the church and the divinely
sanctioned rule of kings and princes. Thus, although early
Christian theologians like Augustine had written of separate
spiritual and temporal spheres of social life, they did not
understand these spheres to be fundamentally different-that is, the
state was not understood to be nonreligious, but was simply a
different aspect of the sovereign authority of God.'
In any event, Augustine and his Platonism were eventually
eclipsed by the Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas. With the
Aristotelian conception of the world as a unified whole, Aquinas
taught that the spiritual and the temporal were bound together in "a
universal synthesis, an all-embracing system, the keynote of which
was harmony and conciliance."' However, the violence and oppression that were the facts of medieval life made harmony and
reconciliation unlikely touchstones for analyzing social life.
Accordingly, theologians of the late Middle Ages and the early
Reformation returned to the Augustinian separation of the spiritual
and the temporal. This time, however, the separation was made
more fundamental.'7 Luther and Calvin both argued that God had
lishment of papal supremacy in the late 11th century. However, even Berman
acknowledges that church and state remained intertwined until well after that
time, and he appears to concede as well that the gains of the church in this respect were not finally consolidated until the Reformation. See H. BERMAN,
LAW AND REVOLUTION 87-114passim, 268, 288 (1984).
14. A. LINDSAY,

RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY IN THE MODERN

WORLD 7 (1943).
15. Augustine, for example, conceived of the world as divided between
the "City of God!--the spiritual province of the church-and the "City of
Man"--the temporal province of the state. Nevertheless, for Augustine
there was not one body of men who formed the state and one which
formed the church, for all men were included in both. There was only
a single Christian society,.., and it included.., the whole world.
G. SABINE, supra note 13, at 225.
16. Id. at 248.
17. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre states that in the late Middle Ages,
the synthesis of the spiritual and the temporal advocated by Aquinas was
"replaced by an appeal to divine revelation and to mystical experience," which
together emphasized the "distance between God and man." A. MACINTYRE, A
SHORT HisTORY OF ETHICS 119 (1966).
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instituted two kingdoms on earth, one spiritual to be administered
by the church, and the other temporal to be ruled by a civil
sovereign. This dualism was incorporated into the theologies of certain Protestant sects of the late Reformation, such as the Anabaptists
in Europe-ancestors of the contemporary Amish and Mennonite
sects-and the separatist Puritans in England. In the view of both
Anabaptists and Puritans, unity or alignment of the church with
civil government unavoidably corrupted the church and stained the
religious conscience of its believers. The only solution that would
preserve the religious integrity of the church and its believers was
separation of their religious activities of devotion and worship from
the political activities of government. Thus, both Anabaptists and
Puritans incorporated a theological principal of church-state separation.'
The "Reformation" is an ironic name for the revolution set off
by Luther, since far more was destroyed by the Reformation than
was reformed by it.' Despite the threat of torture by the Inquisition,
the heresy of Protestantism spread throughout Europe. Moreover, it
quickly became clear that the heretics themselves often disagreed
as violently with each other as they did with Rome. A prince who
established, say, Lutheranism as the state religion within his realm
had to contend with unrest not only from the Catholics among his
subjects, but also from non-Lutheran Protestant dissenters. No
longer could civil government assume that society rested on any
sort of religious consensus; the Reformation "fragment[ed] moral
authority in the modern world."'
This moral fragmentation marked the birth of something the
Western world now takes for granted-religious pluralism. In the
16th and 17th centuries, however, pluralism was a new phenomenon
that posed a serious challenge to the ability of the emerging nationstates of Europe to govern their subjects. As the Protestant
Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation contended
throughout Europe, kings and princes chose sides by establishing
either Catholicism or one of the new Protestant sects as the official
state religion of their respective realms. Although dissenters from
the state religion were sometimes tolerated, this was the exception
rather than the rule, especially in the early days of the
Reformation. This meant that obedience to the crown usually had a
theological as well as a political dimension: One who obeyed the
king was perceived as recognizing not only the civil authority of

18. M. ASHLEY, ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 26-33 (3d ed.
1967); R. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF THE 16TH CENTURY 95-101, 107, 233
(1952).
19. See THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 518-19 (P. Garraty & P.

Gay ed. 1972) [hereinafter Garraty & Gay].
20. R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 174 (2d ed. 1986).
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the king to govern the realm, but also the religious authority of the
church or sect with which the king had aligned his domain.2'
So long as obedience to civil authority retained a religious dimension, one could count on massive civil disobedience on the part
of dissenters from the state religion. The ability of civil government to enforce the law and command the respect of its subjects
would be in doubt. The new religious pluralism that now existed in
most of Europe demanded that civil and ecclesiastical authority be
separated if the nation-states were not to spend extraordinary resources merely to maintain civil law and order.'
For both theological and political reasons, then, the catholic
unity of church and state on which European society had rested for
nearly a thousand years eventually disappeared. Although by the
end of the 18th century the established state church was still the rule
for the nations of Europe, most of them, by law or custom, had
reached accommodations with religious dissenters which recognized their existence and occasionally even granted them limited
political and civil rights. With this tacit recognition that secular
government had no jurisdiction over religious conscience,
widespread civil disobedience eventually ceased. The Reformation
thus yielded the first condition for creation of the secular society,
namely, the conceptualization of church and state as inhabiting
separate spheres of social life.
B
Pluralism presented an even greater problem for the United
States than it did for Europe. The various colonies had been settled
by culturally and ethnically diverse groups of people. Difficulties of
travel and communication in the 17th and 18th centuries ensured
that the colonies would develop generally different ways of living
and thinking rather than melding their differences into a common
culture. This cultural diversity was a fact of colonial religious life
as well. The Congregationalists of New England reflected the strict
Calvinism of their Puritan forebears, while the Anglican establishment of England was strongest in Virginia and the other
Southern colonies. Maryland was settled by Roman Catholics.
Baptists, Presbyterians, and Methodists, and to a lesser extent
Catholics and Jews, were sprinkled throughout all of the colonies,
21. See Smith, Separation and the 'Secular': Reconstructing the

Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 964 (1989) ("With church and
state united,. . dissent from the church would naturally imply opposition to
the state").
22. This is one aspect of Locke's argument for religious toleration. See
Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration in J. LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 167, 213-221 (C.
Sherman ed. 1979) (originally published 1689).

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[20:113

with perhaps the most diverse religious population residing in the
mid-Atlantic colonies of New York and New Jersey. Towards the
end of the 18th century, the influence of the secular Enlightenment
was felt in the proliferation of deism among intellectuals like
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine. It was
due in no small part to the religious diversity of the colonies that the
Bill of Rights contained unprecedented provisions guaranteeing
freedom of religious conscience and prohibiting the establishment
of a national church. 2'
As if the religious diversity of the 18th century were not enough,
the Second Great Awakening exploded upon the American scene in
the early 19th century. This period saw the resurgence of Protestant
fundamentalism, with the multiplication of Protestant sects almost
beyond number and the formation of numerous experimental religious communities. This period also saw the birth of distinctly
American religions like Christian Science and Mormonism.
By the midpoint of the 19th century, it had become clear that no
single religious denomination would ever dominate the American
cultural scene; there were simply too many of them for any one to
rise above the rest. As a consequence, there was no single denominational language that was adequate to the task of communication
among such a theologically diverse population. Of necessity,
Americans began to move toward a less sectarian language in public life. It was only by using a more secular language that one
could carry on public business and dialogue without importing into
the discussion the divisive theological differences that were reflected in the distinctively religious voices of the innumerable
American sects. "Secular" gradually came to be associated with
"religiously neutral."
The move away from sectarian language as the preferred
American vocabulary of public discourse did not immediately signal the end of public religious influence. In the first place, there
was no explicit 19th century ethic that required the divorce of religion from politics and government; on the contrary, both churches
and individuals actively intervened on behalf of self-consciously
religious agenda well into the 20th century. 2' There was no clear
23. See generally Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559, 1594-95 (1989); Berman, Religion and Law: The First
Amendment in Historical Perspective, (1986) 35 EMORY L.J. 777, 787-88,
(1986).
24. Smith, supra note 21, at 966-71. Thomas Curry has argued that
Americans of the founding era understood "establishment of religion" to refer
only to the state's funding and coercing participation in a particular religion, T.
CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 133-37 passim (1986), an understanding that
persisted into the 19th century. Curry summarizes this point as follows:
Both those who supported and those who opposed state support of
religion agreed that an establishment of religion meant primarily a
(continued)
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division of society into spheres of the religious and the secular in
the 19th century; rather, religion and government emerged as competing centers of institutional authority, each of which tacitly
recognized the pre-eminence of the other in certain matters. In 19th
century America, this meant that as a matter of both custom and
law, the government could not interfere in the ifiternal affairs of
the church, and the church likewise was prohibited from writing its
theology into law to be enforced by the government. 25 For the
individual citizen, however, no such limits existed. While
government could not coerce religious belief, it was perfectly free to
regulate and even to prohibit religiously motivated action whenever
it was thought desirable for public safety or welfare.' By the same
token, it was both legally and culturally acceptable for individuals
to argue public policy in explicitly religious, even sectarian, terms,
and many did so. Indeed, the abolitionist movement of the early
part of the 19th century and the Progressive movement of the latter
part of the century were both decisively influenced by groundswells
of religious fundamentalism. By the 1930s, however, politicians
discovered that maximizing their political appeal to a diverse
religious population in an industrial society required that they mute
the sectarian element of their message. A politician who needed
votes from a theologically diverse electorate could succeed only if
state preference for one religion that constituted a tyrannical intrusion of the government into religious affairs. [T]he image of an
establishment that continued to dominate in the minds of Americans
during the revolutionary period was one modelled on the Anglican
establishment in England.
Id. at 191-92.
Robert Cord has gone further, arguing that the founders understood the establishment clause to permit government aid and assistance on a nondenominational or nonpreferential basis. See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (1982). In contrast, Douglas Laycock argues that the framers understood the establishment clause to prohibit financial assistance even on a nonpreferential basis, and that they would have understood it to prohibit the nonfinancial assistance characteristic of the defacto Protestant establishment if
they had thought about the question. Laycock, "Nonpreferential Aid to
Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875

(1986) [hereinafter Laycock, OriginalIntent]. Whereas Cord and Laycock both
believe that the historical evidence supports the view that the founders consciously understood the religion clauses to apply to nonpreferential aid, Curry
argues that the founders simply did not think about the question in these terms,
if at all. See, e.g., T. CURRY, supra, at 123-24.
25. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
26. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 108 (1878). Michael
McConnell has recently cast doubt on the proposition that the belief-action distinction was settled law when Reynolds was decided. See McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise of Religion, 103

HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1430-31 (1990).
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he used a language that appealed to all without offending any. This
move away from sectarian language was encouraged by the
dramatic increase in immigration from Europe during the second
half of the 19th century, which added significant numbers of
Catholics and Jews to the diversity of Protestant sects that already
existed among Americans. Thus, the move away from
sectarianism toward secularism in public discourse was inspired,
not by any Enlightenment belief that the separation of church and
state required more than the institutional separation of the
Reformation, but rather by the pragmatic instinct that a more
secular public discourse was essential to political success.
The move away from sectarianism toward secularism likewise
did not obscure the fact that Americans remained generally
Protestant despite the recent influx of nonProtestant immigrants.
However, seemingly limitless sectarian differences restricted even
this influence to general manifestations that would not provoke theological argument among the Protestant majority, such as extolling
the virtues of hard work and individualism, or appropriating
Biblical images like William Jennings Bryan's "cross of gold."
While religious imagery remained acceptable and influential in
American public life, the need to keep such imagery at a high level
of generality diluted it of much of its rhetorical power. Perhaps
more important, it necessarily restricted theologically meaningful
religious discourse to private life, outside of the public realm of law,
politics, and government. Vague references to deity, expiation,
forgiveness, and charity, typified by Lincoln's Second Inaugural
Address, began to delineate the boundary of effective religious
discourse in public. Sectarian discourse became increasingly
confined to private life, and ultimately survived in public life only
as "civil religion-faintly Protestant platitudes which reaffirmed
the religious base of American culture despite being largely void of
theological significance.'
Thus, Protestantism still affected public business, but implicitly, more as the source and background of political movements
than as the movements themselves. This religious influence has
become known as the "defacto Protestant establishment."' Public
schools read from the King James Bible and emphasized individuality rather than community in judgment and action.' A similar
27. Cf R. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
IN TIME OF TRIAL (1975). Bellah considers civil religion to have considerably
more substantive content than I suggest in the text.

28. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN

AND THE WILDERNESS 11

(1965).

29. By the end of the 19th century American Catholics had become so
frustrated by the pervasive Protestant bias of the public schools that they
withdrew from the public school system altogether and established an extensive system of privately funded parochial schools. See generally Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Our public
school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent with it than
(continued)
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Protestant piety was reflected in the solidification of customs such
as legislative prayer and recognition of Thanksgiving, Christmas
and Easter holidays. States outlawed blasphemy, punished atheism,
and enforced the Christian Sabbath. The resurgence of political
activity by religious fundamentalists in the latter part of the 19th
century put government authority behind temperance, anti-evolution
and anti-polygamy laws. These laws and actions often were not defended in theological terms-as necessary, for example, to building
the kingdom of God on earth-but rather in more secular terms, as
necessary to building and maintaining a well-ordered, "civilized"
society.'
The 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States, then,
were characterized by a curious melding of religion and government in American public life which left public discourse caught between sectarian and secular language. It would not remain long in
this awkward and unstable state, however. The pragmatic move toward a public discourse with less offensive and more broadly appealing religious content sowed the seeds of a more fundamental
limitation on public discourse which bore fruit in the 20th century.

C
Reformation Protestants, whether as dissenters or as the established church, were every bit as uncompromising and fanatical as
were their Catholic predecessors.'1 So blindly and completely did the
with the Catholic culture and scheme of values."); Bradley, The No Religious
Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has

Gone of Itself, 37 CASEW. RES.674, 684, 727-28 (1987); Laycock, A Survey of
Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO Sr. L.J. 409, 417-18 (1986).

30. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878); cf. T.
CURRY, supra note 24, at 123-24 (discussing 18th century American attitudes):
The modern mind tends to assume that the logical corollary to the
statement 'no religious Profession in particular [should] be established'
is that religion in general may or should be established, but that was
not what [was] assumed. [Tihey opposed a particular Protestant denomination to Protestantism in general, which later they did not
equate with an establishment. [T]he notion of prayer and worship
based on the Bible that was accepted by all Protestants did not amount
to a general establishment, but constituted an essential foundation of
civilization.
For a summary of the extensive interactions between religion and government
during this period, see Berman, supra note 23, at 780-85; Laycock, Oriinal
Intent, supra note 24, at 914-18.
31. G. CLARK, THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 309-12 (2d ed. 1947); see,
e.g., G. SABINE, supra note 13, at 363 (describing Calvinism as generally

"illiberal, oppressive, and reactionary). Protestants and Catholics alike in the
(continued)

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[20:113

adherents to different religious sects hate that each persisted in
decades-long attempts to exterminate the others, culminating in the
mindless carnage of the Thirty-Years War in continental Europe'
and a century of violence in England caused by Henry VIII, his
daughter Mary, and the Puritan Revolution.' This bloodshed, of
course, was in addition to the ubiquitous oppression of Jews and
other nonChristians. s4
To the 17th century intellectual, then, religion was a scourge,
whether it was Protestant or Catholic. It had become a violent and
destabilizing enterprise that put the world on a backwards course.'

post-Reformation period persecuted, tortured, and killed people for their failure to confess orthodox beliefs. See, e.g., M. ASHLEY, supra note 18, at 125-27;

R. BAINTON, supra note 18, at 56, 101-06; G. CLARK, supra, at 313-317; G.
SABINE, supra note 13, at 372.
32. GARRATY & GAY, supra note 19, at 586-88. Intermittent religious war
had raged in Europe for over 100 years prior to the outbreak of the Thirty
Years War in 1618. GARRATY & GAY, supra note 19, at 584; G. SABINE, supra
note 13, at 372. However, the Thirty Years War brought unprecedented devastation to Western Europe:
[W]arfare now became general [and] took on a life of its own. Most of
the fighting had been done, according to the custom of the time, by
mercenaries. When after years of costly campaigning the rulers ran
out of money, the mercenaries extracted their wages in the form of
plunder, rape, and senseless destruction. Troops of armed men
roamed the countryside in search of peaceful towns to loot. They
blackmailed entire communities, pillaged churches and monasteries.
GARRATY & GAY, supra note 19, at 588. For a summary of diplomatic and
political aspects of the War, see G. CLARK, supra note 31, at 158-62.
33. M. ASHLEY, supra note 18, at 80-81; R. BAINTON, supra note 18, at
197-99, 204-06. Many of the deaths during Henry's reign, however, were less
the result of religious animus than of misapprehension by his subjects of the
implications of his conflicted political strategy of "schism without heresy," by
which he sought to escape the authority of the Pope while at the same time
maintaining a national church that was in all other respects orthodox. Id. at
197-99.
34. See, e.g., H. Kung, supra note 12, at 168.
35. See R. NEUHAUS, supra note 20, at 156:

[T]he wars of religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have
left an indelible mark upon Western political thought and practice.
From that experience we presumably learned that particularist
religion is an impossibly divisive dynamic, destroying the foundations
of the polis it would control. Still in the 19th century [intellectuals]
were operating from the memory of religion's ambition and ability to
dominate.
See also T.

EAGLETON, LITERARY

THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 17 (1983):
(continued)
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Accordingly, the ethic that grew out of the secular Enlightenment
was that reason, education, and science held the key to civilization
and progress.' When considered against the order of the newly
discovered Newtonian universe, the dogmatism, violence, and fanaticism that seemed to have accompanied 16th and 17th century
religion stamped it as a dangerous superstition. The Enlightenment
project was to apply the tools of reason and science to the truth
claims of religion, thereby liberating society from the intellectual
oppression and political instability that religion perpetuated. Freed
from the restraining influence of unreasonable and undemonstrable beliefs, society could progress to a more tolerant and enlightened state.' Thus, the authoritarianism of both Catholic and
Reformation Protestant ecclesiology was severely criticized.'
Rather than insisting that the commandments be obeyed because
they issued from God, and that priests and rulers be respected because they represented God on earth, Enlightenment thinkers required reasonable and increasingly empirical explanations for
such obedience and respect. When the churches could not supply
naturalistic explanations for their beliefs, they became
intellectually discredited.
The Enlightenment reached full flower in the United States during the 20th century.' The conflict between evolution and fundamentalist religion which culminated in the Scopes trial is an
example of how science displaced religion in American public life
during the 20th century. Edward Purcell writes that during this era,
the idea of the middle ages, dominated by scholastic philosophy, an authoritarian church, and a hierarchical social
order, emerged as the preeminent symbol of everything that
was bad in human society. Science, gaining strength since
the seventeenth century, and finally able to discredit those

Eighteenth century England had emerged, battered but intact, from a
bloody civil war in the previous century which had set the social
classes at each others' throat; and in the desire to reconsolidate a
shaken social order, the neoclassical notions of Reason, Nature, order
and propriety... were key concepts.
36. See G. CLARK, supra note 31, at 243-44, 253-55; H. KUNG, supra note
12, at 86, 413; G. SABINE, supra note 13, at 577, 620.
37. See, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 181 (describing Helvetius's
belief in "almost limitless possibilities of transforming human nature, if only
political despotism and ecclesiastical obscurantism did not prevent radical reform of the educational system").
38. See, e.g., J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DIscouRsEs 12941 (G. Cole trans. ed. 1950).
39. See E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC

NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
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"Dark Ages," was inextricably tied up in the minds of most
intellectuals with everything that was best in human
society.' °
Today, there is a serious division between religion (especially
conservative religion) and intellectual life. Indeed, the term
"fundamentalist" is generally taken to be a synonym for "anti-intellectual," and even so-called "liberal" denominations are not
taken seriously to the extent that they cling to beliefs in genuine
divinity.' Faithfulness to the ideal of the secular society predominates among American intellectuals,' and aggressive secularism
pervades American intellectual life.' Public life goes on without
religion, although large numbers of Americans remain religiously
faithful in private.
II
Despite its having toppled the edifice of religion in the public
square, secularism itself is built on a weak intellectual foundation.
40. Id. at 61.
41. See R. NEUHAUS, supra note 20, ch. 13.
42. White, Response to Roger Cramton's Article, 37 J. LEGAL EDUc. 533,

533 (1985):
(There is] a peculiar division between academic and religious thought
in our culture. In the academic world, we tend to speak as though all
participants in our conversation were purely rational actors engaged
in rational debate; perhaps some people out there are sufficiently benighted that they turn to religious beliefs or other superstitions, but
that is not true of us or, if it is true, we hide it, and it ought not to be
true of them. Ours is a secular academy and, we think, a secular state.
See also K GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6

(1988):
A good many professors and other intellectuals display a hostility or
skeptical indifference that amounts to a thinly disguised contempt for
belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific inquiry or
ordinary human experience.
Accord M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW 10, 211 n.10 (1988)
[hereinafter M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW]; Cramton, Beyond the
Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1985); Lee, The Role of the
Religious Law School, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1175 (1985); Shane, Prophets and

Provocateurs,37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 529 (1987).
43. J. REICHLEY,

RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 360 (1985)

(marveling at the persistence of religious belief in the United States despite
"recent incursions by civil humanism among cultural elites").
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In the critique that follows, I rely primarily on Roberto Unger's
seminal work, Knowledge and Politics.' However, Unger is hardly
alone in rejecting the epistemological premises of the
Enlightenment. Contemporary refutation of these premises has been
widespread and decisive. It is, for example, a major focus of the
work of Thomas Kuhn,' Hillary Putnam,' and Richard Rorty,47 to
name three prominent contemporary philosophers.
The Enlightenment aimed to rid society of ideological superstitions, especially religious ones. The fundamental axiom of
Enlightenment thought was that the world could be understood
through the objective application of reason and science once the distorting influence of religious ideologies was overcome.' Although
this view has undergone numerous changes, it survives essentially
intact in liberal political theory. Beneath the Enlightenment privilege granted to secularism lie the roots of liberal psychology, from
which liberal political theory is derived. In the classical liberal account of mind and its relation to the world, a radical distinction is
drawn between subject (the mind) and object (the world).' Mind is
the manifestation of human will, and exhibits the uniqueness of
human personality. Each person has different tastes, preferences,
and beliefs, and as a result each person makes different choices
about how to live. However, the choices people make, together with
their consequences, take place in only one place-Reality, or the
"world-as-it-really-is," somewhere "out there." There are as many
combinations of tastes, preferences, beliefs, and choices as there are
minds, but none of these affect the singular and essential nature of
Reality; it exists in itself, independent of the innumerable manifestations of will within it.' Unger has written that in the liberal account of mind and world,
[w]hat distinguishes men from one another is not that they
understand the world differently, but that they desire different things even when they share the same understanding of
the world. There is only one world of facts and only one
44. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
45. See, e.g., T. KUHN, THE SrRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d

ed. 1970).
46. See, e.g., H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981).
47. See, e.g., R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979)
[hereinafter R. RORTY, THE MIRROR OF NATURE].

48. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
49. Unger argues that this division has been the foundation of Western
conceptions of the self for at least 300 years, R. UNGER, supra note 44, at 40,
299 n.12.
50. R. UNGER, supra note 44, at 39 ("We may be able to show why it is
that we choose one course of action rather than another, but . . . we do not
suppose that the choice of a goal is the same as the acknowledgement of a
fact.").
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form of understanding, fundamentally alike in everyone. A
man may know more or less about the world, but whenever
two men know something truly what they know is the same
thing.5'
This characterization of the liberal position simplifies the variety and complexity that exist in liberal thought, as Unger himself
admits.' Nevertheless, he argues that some version of this description of the position works its way into virtually every aspect of
modern intellectual thought so that "it offers a vantage point from
which to grasp the entire condition of modern thought.'a Whether or
not this global characterization is valid, I intend to argue the more
modest thesis that Unger's description constitutes a position from
which to understand and criticize the dominance of secularism in
American public life.
The foregoing account of mind and world is the foundation of
liberal epistemology: Knowledge of Reality is the only true knowledge.' The will, in its infinite variety, is not subject to rational
analysis; its choices are arbitrary, and thus cannot yield information about Reality.' Something is "true" only to the extent that it

51. Id. at 40.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id.
54. See Peller, Reason and the Mob: The Politics of Representation, 2
TIKKUN, no. 3, at 28-29:

[A] contiriuing thread of th[e Enlightenment] construction of the world
has been the notion that there is a radical distinction between truth, the
representation of the way the world really is, and myth, an interpretation of the world that cannot be proven and thus is merely sentimental
or poetic.
55. Unger argues that "choice is not reducible to understanding.' R.
UNGER, supra note 44, at 42. Desires can be either facts or choices, but never
both at the same time:
Desires can be viewed as either determined facts or contingent
choices, depending on whether we want to explain conduct or to criticize and to justify it, [b]ut the relation between the two assumptions,
desire as determined fact and as arbitrary choice, remains forever a
mystery.
Id. at 43. Accordingly, reason alone cannot defend or attack choices, since desire is beyond rational analysis. Reason can tell us how best to get what we
want (desire as choice), but it cannot tell us what we want (desire as fact). It
therefore has a subsidiary role in justifying or criticizing choice:
(continued)
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corresponds to Reality.' Under liberal premises, then, it is incoherent to talk about "true" choices; one can only talk about "A's"
choices and "B's" choices. And how does one know whether a proposition corresponds to Reality and thus is True? Medieval scholastics sought to demonstrate the correspondence by forcing empirical
observation into a wholly mental construct.' Enlightenment
science then reversed field, forcing what made sense into a wholly
empirical construct.' Contemporary philosophy seeks "to show the
mediation and synthesis" of these two orders: rationalism, or the
"order of ideas," and empiricism, or the "order of events."' No such
synthesis has succeeded and become dominant, but the effort has
had its effect, disqualifying as knowledge rationalism that is
unempirical, and empiricism that is irrational. Thus, unless a
proposition or phenomenon lies within the realm of observable human experience or can be logically proved from empirically verifiable premises, it cannot constitute knowledge about the world.
Instead, it is condemned to the private world of the will, where
"Truth" and "Reality" have no meaning.
The radical separation of mind and world is replicated in liberal political theory. Unger notes that in a liberal political system
operating under the "rule of law," laws must be, inter alia, "general,
uniform, and public," and the government must be perceived as
ideologically neutral-"either as above the antagonism of private
values or as the framework within which those interests are
represented and reconciled. "' Thus, the most uncontroversial
kinds of government action in a liberal political system are based
on objective facts. On the other hand, government actions which appear to be based upon some subjective value preference are problem-

[Wihen all is said and done, reason cannot command us to choose a
course of action simply because it is worthy of being chosen, nor can it
prohibit us from settling on some new aim for our activities. Its industry in the service of desire is indispensable, but limited.
Id. at 44.
56. This theory, sometimes called the "correspondence" or "copy" theory
of truth, is argued in a variety of forms. Garth Hallett has summarized them
as "essentialist"--e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Locke; "empiricist"-e.g.,
Russell; and "atomist"--e.g., early Wittgenstein. G. HALLETT, LANGUAGE AND
TRUTH ch. 1 (1988).
57. R. UNGER, supra note 44, at 13 ("the order of events [was reduced] to
that of ideas so that logic provided the key to all explanation (rationalism)").
58. Id. at 13-14 ("the order of ideas [was reduced] to that of events so
that causality served as the basis of a unified science of the world
(empiricism)").
59. Id. at 14 (describing structural and dialectical theory as examples of
such efforts).
60. Id. at 73.
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atic because they reveal an ideological bias in the decision maker.6
To avoid this, it is argued that liberal government must be neutral
between competing conceptions of the good.' This explains, for
example, the Supreme Court's reluctance to allow government to
suppress pornographic speech in the absence of conclusive empirical
data showing that pornography contributes to criminal behavior.
Without such data, banning pornography appears as a subjective
value choice that arbitrarily privileges one among a number of
competing values,' rather than an action based upon knowledge of
Reality. Thus, notwithstanding its intuition that pornographic
speech is neither desirable nor important, the Court imposes a
relatively stringent standard of review on government efforts to
outlaw it."
To say that the government must be neutral between competing
conceptions of the good, however, is not to say that it must be neutral
between competing conceptions of Reality. Once the nature and
content of Reality has been convincingly demonstrated, neutrality
does not require that government remain aloof from competing
conceptions of it. For example, excluding members of the Flat-Earth
Society from eligibility for National Science Foundation grants
would not be a departure from neutrality. Once revealed, Reality is
"beyond mere interpretation," embodying "truth itself."' Liberal
government might tolerate those who dissent from Reality by letting
them speak, but it is not required to indulge such dissenters to the
extent of ordering its affairs as if they might be right. Therefore,
when confronted with ideological dissensus, one of the key tasks of
61. See id. at 89 ("If the law applier cannot justify his decisions, because
they appear to rest on his own individual and subjective values, liberty will
suffer.")
62. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL SrATE
(1980); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972).
63. See, e.g., Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity,

63 COLuM. L. REv. 391 (1963).
64. Compare Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, at 63 (1973)
("Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching [the] conclusion
[that commercial exploitation of sex is socially harmful] and acting on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data.")
and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) ("few of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right
to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theatres of our choice") with
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30, 33-36 (1973) (pornography may be outlawed as obscene only if it appeals to the "prurient interest" under community
standards, portrays specifically defined sexual conduct in a "patently offensive
way," and lacks "serious" intellectual value when considered "as a whole").
Although the Miller test is not as stringent as the standard of review applied to
political speech, it is more exacting than either rational basis review or even
the intermediate-level scrutiny applied to regulation of commercial speech.
65. Peller, supra note 54, at 43. See also R. Putnam, supra note 3, at 192

("Facts are the way things are, the way things (or events) happen").
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liberal politics is to police the epistemological boundary between
mind and will by distinguishing subjective values from objective
facts.' An idea or conception that originates in the subjective world
of value choices is suspect as a justification for government action.
Conversely, ideas and conceptions that are placed in the objective
world of Reality are presumptively legitimate as justifications for
government action, regardless of the number or vigor of dissenters.
In contemporary American culture, secularism constitutes the test
of residency in the world of knowledge. Only if an idea or concept
can be expressed in secular terms-that is, can be verified by
reference to ordinary human experience or by reasoning from
empirically verifiable premises-does it qualify fully as
knowledge.
Confining religion to the subjective side of the boundary between subject and object is the principle strategy by which liberalism has controlled religion since the Enlightenment. In the religious world, subject and object, fact and value, and public and private are often unified, not divided.' Many religious statements
about Reality are not merely description, but incorporate as well a
normative imperative.' "Jesus is the son of God" is not simply
genealogy. Moreover, religious statements about Reality cannot be
verified by naturalistic conventions. Their "truth" is less a matter
of reason or experiment than of faith. Thus, the eventual triumph of
the Enlightenment in 20th century America meant the installation
of secularism as the exclusive means of accessing Reality, and the
banishment of transcendent enterprises like religion to the margins of public life as arbitrary value preferences. Secularism became the privileged discourse in American public life, the baseline
measure of comparison in assessing the cultural validity of all
other modes of discourse.

66. See R. UNGER, supra note 44, at 135:
There must be a complete separation of the will, which makes choices,
and of reason, which produces objective knowledge. In the regime of
legal justice.. . , the results of legislation and adjudication cannot be
justified simply by their usefulness to individual and subjective values.
Above all, there must be a neutral method of adjudication that allows
one to apply the rules regardless of considerations of value or purpose.
67. Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious Belief, 4 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS &PUB. POL. 419, 427-32 (1990).
68. R. UNGER, supra note 44, at 41, 109, 112.
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III

Philosophers these days have largely abandoned the correspondence theory as a test of truth or rationality,' as Professor Perry
suggests.' This does not mean, however, that it is without influence
in the contemporary world. On tl~e contrary, it remains the
dominant test of truth and rationality among the general population, if not among philosophers.' And, as Professor Fejfar points
69. See, e.g., G. HALLETT, supra note 56, ch. 2 (arguing that all versions
of "isomorphic" thinking are seriously flawed); T. EAGLETON, supra note 35, at
143, 146 (arguing that classical notions of reality as whatever is "out there,"
and truth as whatever corresponds to reality, have been seriously undermined); Candlish, The Truth About F.H. Bradley, 98 MIND 331,
339 (1989)
("the idea that language and reality might be identical is hard to take seriously,
whatever some philosophers might have thought"). See also Meynell, An
Approach to Truth, 29 HEYTHROP J. 192 (1988) (conceding that "we have
nowadays abandoned the correspondence theory of truth," then attempting
partially to rehabilitate it). But see Forbes, Truth, Correspondence and
Redundancy in FACT, SCIENCE, AND MORALITY 28 (1986) (defending a correspondence theory of truth). Hallett specifies that "isomorphism"-the general
view that truth entails the necessary matching of words, thoughts, and
things-denotes a somewhat narrower relationship than "correspondence," id.
at 5, but is a necessary condition for it, id. at 29.
70. M. Perry, Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in
American Politics (unpublished manuscript) (Jan. 1990) (hereinafter M.
PERRY, LovE AND POWER] (matching" judgments or statements or sentences' "
with " 'facts' " on the basis of a truth relationship between the paired items
a'arrived on the scene only comparatively recently and has been as
conclusively refuted as any philosophical theory can be' ") (quoting A.
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 357-58 (1988)); M. PERRY,
MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW, supra note 42, at 41 ("'many centuries of attempts to explain what "correspondence" is have failed' ") (quoting R. RORTY,
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM vi, xix (1982)); id. (" 'The idea that truth is a
passive copy of what is "really" (mind-independently, discourse indepen-

dently) "there" has collapsed under the critiques of Kant, Wittgenstein, and

other philosophers' ") (quoting H. PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 130).
71. See, e.g., G. HALLETT, supra note 56, at 17 ("the isomorphic view of
speech, thought, and reality is not based on argument but is taken for granted.
Various pre-reflective views powerfully suggest it") (footnote omitted); id. at
18 (discussing "the influential, widely held version [of isomorphic thinking]
that populates the mind with universal concepts and the universe with corresponding essences"); M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW, supra note 42,
at 40 ("the 'copy' or 'correspondence' theory of truth/knowledge . . . is very
likely the man-in-the-street's position"); Peller, supra note 54, at 28:
Even after the philosophers have abandoned the epistemological project, the attempt to find some firm ground to distinguish truth from
myth, and even after the notion that the world can be neatly divided in
the Cartesian way between the mind and the body has been rejected
(continued)
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out, this mode of thought remains dominant in Western education,
including (or perhaps especially) Western legal education.' As a
result, the liberal account of mind and world continues powerfully
to shape American politics. Its power lies in its ideal of neutrality.
In theory, at least, liberalism takes no position on the validity of
subjective preferences, only on the nature of Reality, once properly
demonstrated. Although in practice the clarity of this distinction is
blurred,' it is clear that government neutrality is anchored in the
objective world-coercive government action is far more likely
when its premises are rational or empirical than when such
premises cannot be produced. When liberal government purports to
avoid religious conflict in politics by remaining religiously neutral, what it is really doing is taking the agnostic position with respect to religious belief.74 In other words, it treats religious belief as
subjective preference which reveals the mind of the believer, rather
than as objective knowledge which reveals Reality.' Unfortunately
for liberals, this position can be genuinely neutral only if the
boundary between the world of subjective preference and the world
of objective fact is natural, fixed, and inevitable. Such
understanding as we have of Reality these days has thrown that
proposition into serious question. Quantum physics, for example,

intellectually, these categories for perceiving and talking about the
world continue to play powerful roles in our day-to-day lives, in the
way that we understand ourselves and each other.
See also Adams, Neo-Blakean Prolegomena to an Unlikely Academic
Structure in H. ADAMS, supra note 6, at 272, 274 (hereinafter Adams,

Prolegomena] (observing that the correspondence theory is "pervasive in public science and the public eye"); R. Putnam, supra note 3, at 189 (noting the
tendency of nonscientists to exaggerate the certainty of scientific knowledge).
72. Fejfar, Legal Education and Legal Scholarship: From Rationalist
Discourse to Dialogical Encounter, 20 CA. U.L. REV. 97 (1991).

73. For arguments that, in fact, liberal politics is not ideologically neutral, see M. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 70; M. PERRY, MORALITY,
POLITICS, AND LAW, supra note 42, ch. 3; R. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985).

74. J. Garvey, God Is Good (1990) (unpublished manuscript); see e.g.,
McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Religious Freedom, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1, 2 (1989); Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally
Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASEW. RES. 357, 408-09 (1990).

75. See, e.g., McConnell & Posner, supra note 74, at 10:
There is no difference to an economist qua economist between a nuisance---say, some form of air pollution-that inflicts costs on third parties greater than the benefits to transactors, and a religion that inflicts
cost on nonadherents that they would be willing to pay something,
perhaps a lot, to remove.
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has demonstrated that objective observation is impossible.' The observer of the universe is also a participant in creating what is observed.'
Secularism does not mark any "natural" distinction between
mind and world; there is no necessary connection between Reality
and our descriptions of it, and no way decisively to demonstrate the
extent, if any, to which our descriptions correspond to Reality." As
Professor Ball observed, distinctions like the one between belief and
action,' which derive from the liberal division between mind and
world, are drawn by the state for its own convenience.' Secularism
does not guard the boundary between mind and world so much as it
manipulates it.'
76. See P. DAvIES, GOD AND THE NEW PHYsICS ch. 8 (1984).
77. Id.

78. This creates what Unger calls the antinomy of theory and fact. We
compare theories independent of facts to see which theory most accurately describes those facts, at the same time realizing that it is theory that gives facts
meaning in the first place, since they have no meaning in themselves:
Thinking and language depend on the use of categories. We must
classify to think and to speak. But we have no assurance that anything
in the world corresponds to the categories we use. Our ideas about
science and nature seem to imply that we believe both that our classifications can be true and false and that the question of their truth and
falsity is unanswerable and illusory.
R. UNGER, supra note 44, at 36. See also Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of
Art in M. HEIDDEGGER, POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT 17, 50 (A. Hofstadter
trans. 1971) ("The true is what corresponds to the real, and the real is what is
in truth. The circle has closed again."); R. Putnam, supra note 3, at 195:
Every experimenter when he turns to construct a theory to fit his data
discards some of the latter as erroneous; often he can identify a cause
(or a likely cause) of the error, but there are times when data are rejected simply because they do not fit. At which point does this sort of
thing turn into "the theory justifies the data", thereby undermining the
very integrity of science? At what point do facts which are to be the
foundation of science turn into fictions?
79. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599, 1600
(1990) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878)); see supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
80. Ball, The Unfree Exercise of Religion, 20 CAP. U.L. REv. 39 (1991).

81. See Peller, supra note 54, at 28-29:
The construction of a realm of knowledge separate from superstition
and the identification of a faculty of reason separate from passion was
not .

.

. simply some mind game played by philosophers and profes-

sional intellectuals. These categories have always served political roles
(continued)
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From this insight has come the post-modern critique. It argues
that liberalism is a failure, the residue of the uncompleted work of
the Enlightenment. Post-modernism rejects the radical distinction
between subject and object that privileges the latter as real and disables the former as merely relative. In fact, post-modernism denies
that there is any way neutrally to demonstrate Reality. To the wide
variety of those who identify themselves as post-modernists, reason
and science are often as suspect as religion.' "One might think of
post-modernism," writes Mark Edmundson, "as trying to get done
what its practitioners had sensed modernism had failed to do; that
is, to purge the world of superstition in every form."' In post-modern thought, the Enlightenment project is a failure, having only
succeeded in replacing worship of God (a religious power criterion)
with worship of science (a secular power criterion). The liberal assumption is that secularist discourse naturally, neutrally and
inevitably reveals Reality. Post-modernism, on the other hand,
asserts that there is no privileged discourse that can lay bare
Reality and affirm the Truth; all forms of human discourse are biased and skewed by ideological allegiance.
Post-modernism does not necessarily entail denial that Reality
exists, only denial that one can know in any objectively decisive
way what Reality is like.' Nor does it deny that the usefulness of
in differentiating groups as worthy or unworthy and in justifying
particular social hierarchies.
See also T. EAGLETON, supra note 35, at 124:

[M]an needs to police the absolute frontier between the [subjective and
the objective] as vigilantly as he does just because it may always be
transgressed, has always been transgressed already, and is much less
absolute than it appears.
82. See generally Adams, The Fate of Knowledge, in H. ADAMS, supra

note 6, at 223, 228-29:
The idea of empiricism as the foundation of science has been largely
dismissed. The whole realm of the philosophy of science has become a
battleground since the notion has been put forward that science and its
processes are governed to some considerable extent by the social and
institutional fabric in which the work is carried on and the nature of
the work is constituted. [T]he role of the scientist has been hemmed in
and structured according to laws that have little to do with the old idea
of the autonomous subject investigating an object.
83. Edmundson, Prophet of a New Post-Modernism: The Greater
Challenge of Salmon Rushdie, HARPER'SMAG., Dec. 1989, at 62, 63 (emphasis

added).
84. Thus, as Perry points out, rejection of the correspondence theory
does not require rejection of the realist position-that Reality exists indepen(continued)

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[20:113

human knowledge may derive from some relationship to Reality.a
What it protests is the privileging of certain kinds of knowledge as
real, and other kinds of knowledge as un-real, based on some
claimed access to Reality. Any such claim must be false because, as
Perry has succinctly stated, "we lack access to Reality.' m
In the post-modern view, "certain meanings are elevated by social ideologies to a privileged position, or made the centres around
which other meanings are forced to turn.' In other words, what
constitutes knowledge, and therefore what is considered Real, is a
function of culture rather than of nature.' Those in a position to
influence society and culture impose their view of the world-of
Reality-on the less powerful by dressing their view up in the guise
of nature.' "He who has the power, to decide what a thing will be
85. Thus, rejection of the correspondence theory does not require that
one accept the complete dependence of Reality on mind. Although we may
forever lack access to Reality, we still know enough to get things done. See M.
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 70; cf P. DAVIES, supra note 77, at 219:

[T]he quantum theory has prompted many physicists to declare that
there is no "objective" reality at all. The only reality is that revealed
through our observations. Adopting this view, it is not possible to pronounce a particular theory "right" or "wrong", merely that it is useful
or less useful, a useful theory being one which connects a wide range
of phenomena in a single descriptive scheme to high accuracy.
86. M. PERRY, MORALITY, PoLITIcs AND LAW, supra note 42, at 41.
87. T. EAGLETON, supra note 35, at 131.

88. Id. at 135 ("[S]igns which pass themselves off as natural, which offer
themselves as the only conceivable way of viewing the world, are by that token authoritarian and ideological"); R. UNGER, supra note 44, at 103 ("the experience of the precariousness and contingency of all shared values in society
•.. arises from the sense that shared values reflect the prejudices and interests
of dominant groups rather than a common perception of the good").
89. Lacan, The Meaning of the Phallus in FEMININE SEXUALITY:
JACQUES LACAN AND THE ]tCOLE FREUDIENNE 74 (J. Mitchell & J. Rose ed.

1982). Using the image of the phallus, Lacan argues that the key to exercising
power in modern society is the "presence" that is assumed to underlie and give
meaning to language-that is, the Reality that we take to be simultaneously
independent of yet represented by our words. By speaking-using languageone takes upon herself the power of the phallus, projecting the Reality behind
the words she uses against those to whom she speaks:
For the phallus is a signifier, a signifier whose function in the
intrasubjective economy of analysis might lift the veil from that which
it served in the mysteries. For it is to this signified that it is given to
designate as a whole the effect of there being a signified....
Id. at 79-80. See also id. at 78, If there were no such presence behind
language, however, words would have no essential meaning and,
(continued)
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called," writes Unger, "has the power to decide what it is."' The
subjective and arbitrary view of the world espoused by the dominant
ideology then appears as an objective fact which need not be
defended in ideological terms-indeed, which need hardly be defended at all.M
If this post-modern insight is correct, then secularism has no exclusive claim as the language of American public life. Public religious discourse was discredited as arbitrary subjectivity by a secular critique that pretends to be neutral and objective, but which beneath that pretense is itself arbitrary and subjective. There can no
longer be any empirical argument for keeping religious discourse
out of public life. If there is to be authentic political dialogue, then
both religious and secular voices properly assert themselves in public life.
This is not to say that secular knowledge may not be more useful than religious knowledge in many contexts. Often secularism
is more useful than religion, given a specific task or need.
it served in the mysteries. For it is to this signified that it is given to
designate as a whole the effect of there being a signified....
Id. at 79-80. See also id. at 78, If there were no such presence behind
language, however, words would have no essential meaning and,
therefore, no power. Language could not project the non-existent
presence; indeed, it could not project anything at all, except itself. See
id. at 82, 83. Accordingly, power cannot assert itself effectively
through language unless the non-existence of the Reality language
purports to represent is hidden or disguised: "[T]he phallus can only
play its role as veiled, that is, as in itself the sign of the latency with
which everything significable is struck as soon as it is raised to the
function of a signifier." Id. at 82 (emphasis added). See also id. at 8384. Without Reality, the basis of exercising power in society is naked
imposition.
90. R. UNGER, supra note 44, at 80.

91. See T. EAGLETON,supra note 35, at 124:
[A]IR conventions and operations [of a society] are the ideological products of a particular history, crystallizing ways of seeing... which are
far from uncontroversial. Whole social ideologies may be implicit in an
apparently neutral critical method; and unless studying such methods
takes account of this, it is likely to result in little more than servility to
the institution itself.
See also Putnam, supra note 3, at 194:
[The familiar world of facts is simply the world of a very familiar
version. It is the world of a theory so old, so entrenched, so successful,
that it is for us the world that is "there," that needs explaining (but not
warranting)....
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The task of politics with respect to religion, however, is neither
so focused nor so mechanical. At the heart of conflicts between
belief and knowledge is the question "how we should contend with
Liberals
each other's deepest differences in the public sphere.'
sometimes argue that secularization is the necessary solution to this
problem.' Without largely privatizing religion and secularizing
public life, the argument goes, a religiously plural society runs the
risk of dissolving into the chaos and violence that characterized
post-Reformation Europe. Thus, in this view, the American
experiment has proven that the only way for people peacefully to
coexist in a religiously plural society is to remove religious belief
as a legitimate predicate for political and other public action.
Religious people can participate in public life, but only if they mute
their religious beliefs by translating them into secular dialect.'

92.

THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER:

A

NATIONAL CELEBRATION AND

REAFFIRMATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES 8

(1988).
93. See, e.g., Zimmerman, To Walk a Crooked Path: Separating Law
and Religion in the Secular State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1095, 1101-03

(1986); Solum, supra note 9, at 1089-92; Marshall, supra note 74, at 409-411.
94. Commentators who point to the numerous intersections between religion and politics during recent decades as evidence that American politics is
not hostile to religion have missed the point. See, e.g., Blumoff, Disdain for the
Lessons of History: Comments on Love and Power, 20 CAP. U.L. REV. 159

(1990); Tushnut, Religon in Politics (Book Review), 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1131,
1134-35 (1989) (reviewing K. GREENAWALT, supra note 42); Thomas,
Comments on Papers by Milner Ball and Frederick Gedicks, 4 NOTRE DAME

J.L. ETHICS, & PUB. POL. 451, 453 (1990). Because religions cannot demonstrate the correspondence of their beliefs to Reality under the naturalistic conventions of liberal epistemology, they and their beliefs are confined to the private world of preference and denied admission to the public world of knowledge. Only if religious individuals and organizations disguise the religious
character of their beliefs can they engage in public dialogue. In other words, to
participate properly in liberal politics, they must refashion their beliefs to fit
liberal conceptions of knowledge. Speaking from an environment in which fact
and value are united, they must excise from their speech all references to matters which are beyond ordinary human experience or incapable of empirical
demonstration, since these are classified by liberalism as value choices that
cannot be subjected to rational or empirical analysis, and thus are not "real".
Many religious people and organizations have done this, translating their beliefs from a language of faith into the language of secularism-of unbelief.
Having done so, they are free to speak as loudly as they want in the political
area. Unfortunately for them, what they say is no longer authentic, having
been cut off from the transcendent source of meaning and power that moved
them to speak in the first place. As Perry has observed, such people are not
participating in political dialogue as their authentic selves, but as "some oneor some thing-else." M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW, supra note 42,

at 182; accord Gedicks, supra note 67, at 432-39. Yet, religious people and organizations that do not properly sanitize their speech are controversial for
(continued)
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The use of American history to buttress the argument for a secularized politics is curious. The American adoption of a public ethic
of secularism is a phenomenon of only the last fifty or sixty years;
prior to 1930, public life in the United States was not secular.9
While it is true that the United States has been spared the religious
violence that shook post-Reformation Europe, crediting this to secularism is problematic since it did not become the norm for
American public life until long after the founding era. Whatever
has allowed us to live with "our deepest differences," it is not public
secularism.
More fundamentally, secularism has not solved the problem
posed by religion in public life so much as it has buried it. By placing religion on the far side of the boundary marking the limit of
the real world, secularism prevents public life from taking religion
seriously. Secularism does not teach us to live with those who are
religious; rather, it demands that we ignore them and their views.
Such a "solution" can remain stable only so long as those who are
ignored acquiesce in their social situation. The last two decades
suggest that acquiescence in a secularized public life (by religious
conservatives, at least) is vanishing, if it has not already disappeared.

IV
The stridency with which religion has re-entered American
public life in the last decade underscores the importance of Adams's
insight that most critical discourse opposes power with power. There
remains the possibility that the conflict between religion and secularism in public life could end with the triumph of religion.
Against an international backdrop of regional religious violence
and resurgent fundamentalism, the prospect of public life governed
by a dominant religious ideology is not pleasant.' Thus, those who
feel threatened by the possibility of a repressive religious regime
fight ever harder against the entrance of religious ideologies into
public life, at the same time that adherents to such ideologies are
having spoken at all. They are criticized as intruding upon secular areas beyond their competence, as were the Catholic Bishops in authoring their pastoral letters on economic justice and arms control; or ridiculed, as was Pat
Robertson in publicly declaring the power of prayer; or ignored, as was no less
a liberal hero than Martin Luther King when he expounded the theological basis of nonviolent civil disobedience and racial equality. And if unsanitized religious speech comes into proximity with the actual processes of law-making, it
becomes a basis for declaring the products of those processes unconstitutional
under the establishment clause. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968).
95. See supra Part I-B.
96. Cf M. ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1985).
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fighting ever harder to enter public life. The way out of this zerosum power struggle-perhaps the only way-is adoption of an
antithetical voice for public discourse that rises above the conflict
between religion and secularism without negating it.
The antithetical struggle is the striving to oppose power without
invoking power and without denying the contradiction in power relationships. In the antithetical stance, one seeks to provide "creative
opposition"' to both the prevailing power and its opposite without
privileging either one.' An antithetical stance would seek to free
one from the polarized oppositional structure of public discourse that
is the consequence of liberal epistemology. At the same time, it
would seek to recognize that opposites might both be valid even
though they cannot be reconciled.' The subject-object distinction
irresistibly draws one to frame questions in a "one-or-the-other, allor-nothing" mode. The triumph of one pole is the defeat of the other.
But such victories and defeats are only temporary, lasting only as
long as it takes to develop the next critique and set up a new oppositional structure. Power is never defeated, but only transformed.1' In

97. Adams, Canons, supra note 6, at 753.
98. Id. at 754 (emphasis added): "The 'antithetical' strives to refuse all
negations arising from the gestures of power: the object over the subject, the
universal (or general) over the particular, the 'good' over the 'evil,' and in all
cases vice versa."

99. Adams, Prolegomena, supra note 71, at 272-73 (discussing Romantic
poet William Blake's distinction between negations and contraries):
A negation is a situation of oppositions in which one side is privileged
over the other, negating the right of the other to equal existence. One
side is declared good, the other evil. A true contrary would be one in
which the distinction itself is one side of an opposition of equality.
100. Adams uses the feminist attack on the white, male, aristocratic character of the Western literary tradition as an example of this phenomenon. See
Adams, Canons,supra note 6, at 755-57. He argues that an author's gender is
theoretically irrelevant to inclusion or exclusion of such author's works from*
the literary canon. Gender is highly relevant, however, to canonization decisions dominated by power criteria, which explains the relative lack of racial,
gender, and class diversity among canonized literary works. However, feminist criticism which champions the cause of female authors on the theory that
they were excluded from the Western literary canon as the result of male
power criteria, may itself constitute the invocation of alternative power criteria
derived principally from the characteristics of female writing. The decanonization of a work solely because it is male (or female) would be thoughtlessly to
reject its antithetical character; similarly, canonization of a work solely because
it is female (male), without regard to its antithetical character, is merely to
substitute female power criteria for male power criteria (or vice versa). Adams
argues that antitheticality explains why works by certain authors with ideologically embarrassing or even repugnant beliefs remain within the canon:
(continued)
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an antithetical stance, by contrast, one refuses to accept the conventional dualistic definition of a question which demands that one
choose between polarities. By stepping outside the conceptual boundaries that polarized oppositions fix around the set of "acceptable"
solutions to public policy issues, the antithetical voice reveals and
illuminates new approaches and resolutions that would otherwise
lay undiscovered. Antitheticality "influences . . . the deepest level of
human action: how we see things.""1 "[It] continually challenges
one to think further in a new light or to think again through the
whole-even to the point of unresolvable contradictions-and to be
prepared always to bring in the other that the text suddenly seems to
have supplied."' °
A familiar antithetical figure in the Western tradition is the
prophet of the Hebrew bible. The prophet cannot oppose the power
struggle between orthodoxy and reform with his own power, because
he has none. Lacking social, political or economic status, positioned
on the fringes of society as a .solitary figure, he can move his
hearers to action only by opening to them the poetic vision of his
prophetic message. Yet the prophet is nonetheless effective for his
lack of power, for the vision of prophecy does indeed touch and
change the hearts of its hearers. And the vision does so in a way
that simultaneously transforms and preserves the conflict between
orthodoxy and reform.
The relevance of antitheticality to legal institutions has not
gone unnoticed in the legal world. Professor Perry's work, in particular, resonates to the antithetical. Perry has argued that the
Supreme Court should facilitate moral dialogue rather than resolve

The fact remains that the Anglo-American critical establishment,
which can be described as for the most part politically liberal [but] not
leftist, has not found itself able to and has not wished to banish from
the canon Pound, Eliot, and Lawrence on the right or the early Auden
on the left. The point is that something is operating in the case of
many canonized moderns that is apparently deeper than either literary
...or power criteria and seems to be powerfully antithetical to them.
Id. at 756. Noting the irony of describing antitheticality as a "powerful" opposition to power, Adams substitutes "visionary" for "powerful" in describing the
strength of antithetical opposition: "[V]isionary antitheticality is a power contrary to power." Id. He concludes that some female writers should enter the
canon and that some male authors should exit it, but only on the basis of visionary antitheticality rather than power criteria. Id. at 755, 757.
101. Adams, Canons, supra note 6, at 753 (discussing Oscar Wilde).
102. Id. at 758. See also Adams, The Dizziness of Freedom; or, Why I
Read William Blake, in H. ADAMS, supra note 6, at 3, 17 [hereinafter Adams,
Freedom] ("Every institution worth anything must have built into it a contrary,
reprobate intellectual principle so that imagination is not negated.").
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doctrinal questions,'
and has expressly invoked the prophetic
metaphor."M Indeed, antitheticality is implicit in the title of his
current project, Love and Power.
Even some Supreme Court decisions can be argued to have a visionary antithetical dimension. In Brown v. Board of Education,1'
for example, the Court refused to confine itself to the separate-butequal analysis that had guided the constitution of race relations
since Plessy v. Ferguson,'° more than half a century earlier.
Instead, the Court simply stated that Plessy's separate-but-equal
formula is inherently unequal.' And having unfolded its vision of
racial equality, it declined to coerce conformity to it.' By refusing
to order immediate desegregation, the Court permitted the South
(and the North) to evade the force of its decision for more than a
decade. Only repeated exercises of power by all three branches of the
federal government were sufficient to begin the dismantling of
dejure and defacto segregation. How, then, did the unenforced
decision of Brown come to be the pivotal legal text for racial
equality in the 20th century?
Brown's significance lies in its vision of hope rather than in the
force of the power which it declined to invoke. Brown signalled to
the black community in the United States that change was possible,
if not inevitable, that they had at least one ally among the
institutions of government. This signal was sufficient to energize
the black community to take political action. Some have argued that
this political activity, more than any judicial decision, was the
most significant influence on the government to put the force of its
power behind the civil rights movement."m
But the deployment of federal power has not solved the problem
of racial conflict in the United States. n" The United States is still
103. See M.

PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW, supra note 42, ch. 6.
104. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 98-

102, 111-14 (1982).
105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
107. 347 U.S. at 495: "We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate education facilities are
inherently unequal."
108. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering desegregation to commence "with
all deliberate speed").
109. See, e.g., G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 474 (1986); Bachman, Lawyers, Law, and Social
Change, 13 N.Y.U. L. REv. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 17-21 (1985).
110. I do not wish to be understood here as suggesting that the Supreme
Court's delay in enforcing its decision in Brown was a good thing, or that
(finally) invoking the force of federal power on behalf of black civil rights was
a bad thing. I am suggesting only that the appeal to government power, while
it resulted in an immediate and dramatic improvement of the social situation of
blacks, ultimately resolved little in American race relations.
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searching for the answer to the question implied by the 14th
Amendment and posed explicitly in Plessy: What should "equal
protection of the laws" mean? A "color-blind" society is not the answer. Even if all of the sociological and ideological attitudes and
institutions which now stand in the way of racial justice in the
United States were to melt away, racial difference in the form of
artistic, musical, literary, linguistic and other variation would still
remain. Such difference is rightfully a source of pride and value,
not only to the culture that generates it, but to the larger and broader
communities to which members of the culture belong. We still have
not been able to distinguish those instances in which recognition of
race is harmful from those instances in which this recognition is
valuable. For a vision of racial justice to be truly antithetical, it
must eliminate racial injustice without eliminating racial difference. By so doing, it transforms the relationships between races so
that one sees and acts on the relationships in a different and more
elevated way, without denying that opposition-in the form of difference rather than conflict-still inheres in the relationships."'
What, then, does an antithetical stance contribute to the current
conflict between religion and secularism in American public life?
A post-modern politics must include religious knowledge if it is to
depart from the illusion of neutrality fostered by the privileging of
secular discourse. There can be no mistaking the difficulty of this
task, requiring as it will strange new habits of citizenship in the
public square. At the same time, there can be no avoiding the conclusion that continued exclusion of religious speech from public life
is an arbitrary exercise of social power." The Judeo-Christian
tradition has persisted through more than three millennia because
it works-it helps large numbers of people to live well. As Professor
Perry stated, the Biblical narrative of the Jerusalem-based religions
preserves and communicates a deep human wisdom." We ought to
consider this wisdom in our political deliberations, because
"religion is important," and "God is good." 4 An antithetical stance
would recognize the value in religion and decline to invoke power
to keep it at the margins of public life. Thus, antitheticality would
111. Cf Adams, Freedom, supra note 102, at 10:
When two things are identical, they are not the same, they each maintain their own identities but are in a relation of identicality. This is the
contrary to the alienating object/subject negation and is at the base of
[William] Blake's ethic, which calls for mutuality in human relations.
112. See supra Part III.
113. M. PERRY, LOvE AND POWER, supra note 70.
114. J. Garvey, supra note 74, at 1; cf. H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF
LAW AND RELIGION 75 (1974) ("we must recognize that the great passions
which created our [religious] heritage also create a presumption in favor of
preserving it").
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permit religious knowledge to take a place in the "real" world
alongside secular knowledge.
There is no doubt that this involves risk. Elements of the religious right often seem all too willing to substitute religious power
criteria for secular ones in American public life. This suggests an
antithetical imperative for religion, if it wishes fully to participate
in public life. In one sense, post-modernism is good news for religion, foreshadowing the end of the secular monopoly on public life,
and on knowledge generally. In an6ther sense, however, post-modernism is a threat to religion or, at least, to conservative religion. If
there really is no neutral position from which to discern the Truth,
as post-modern critiques generally argue, then there can be no coherent claim to exclusivity of Truth-a claim which has been an
important and persistent component of many Western religions.
Without a privileged epistemological position from which to discover the "world-as-it-really-is," one can only create the world as
she and her community experience it.
This is not to say that post-modernism deters one from trying to
understand how others experience the world. It means only that
perceptions of how the world is can be authoritative only for those
who experience and hold them. A person's religious experiences are
nonetheless real, but whatever conclusions they lead her to about
Reality can be controlling only for her. "Truth" becomes "truths,"
1
which may not only be multiple, but contradictory."
Thus, postmodernists tend to emphasize freedom and understanding rather
than Truth (or truth).116
Conservative religion must come to grips with why it wants to
participate in public life. Imposing religious ideology on American
public life is merely to exchange secular criteria of legitimacy for
religious ones. Although religious people become the privileged insiders and secular people become the alienated outsiders, the nature
of the conflict-the arbitrary imposition of social power-remains
the same. If the point of religious participation in public life is to
suppress competing secular conceptions of the world, then such participation is not worth the fight."7 If Western belief systems have
115. Cf. R. RORTY, THE MIRROR OF NATURE, supra note 47, at 10

(suggesting that "truth" is "'what is better for us to believe' " rather than " 'he
accurate representation of reality' ") (quoting William James).
116. See, e.g., R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 2, at xiii (the
"historicist turn" in philosophy "has helped us substitute Freedom for Truth as
the goal of thinking and of social progress"). See also Adams, Freedom, supra
note 103, at 13 ("The dizziness of reading Blake.... is the dizziness of an exhilaratingfreedom in language, the sense that there is always an opportunity before us, always a reading to be accomplished.") (emphasis in original).
117. Perry thus suggests that such groups should not be permitted to engage in public discourse, since they presumably lack the skills to engage in ecumenical dialogue. M. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 70; cf. R. Putnam,
supra note 3, at 204 (suggesting that moral dialogue with fascists is impossible
(continued)
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worked for three thousand years, then surely Western knowledge
has worked for at least three hundred-indeed, it has succeeded beyond anyone's wildest dreams. God is good, but so is science; it, too,
has helped many people to live their lives well."m Religion cannot
take its place alongside secularism as a legitimate public discourse
unless secularism remains a legitimate discourse as well.
"Religion without science is blind. Science without religion is
lame." 1 9

Deconstructive criticism is powerful.' ° If no one can tell us how
the world is, if "[ciritique is all there is" and contingency "goes all
the way down," then the human dilemma seems to be a fearful
choice between the ruthless imposition of power and utter silence.'
The antithetical stance points a way out of this nihilistic
conundrum. Religion and secularism both tell us something we can
know about the world, even if neither can tell us how the world is.'
That the knowledge of the world generated by each might contradict
that of the other is hardly reason for rejection.' As the Mormon
prophet Joseph Smith once observed, "by proving contraries, truth is
made manifest."' Only by antithetically embracing all that we
might know can we ever hope to understand what is.

and undesirable). Although this, too, is to oppose power with power, it may be

unavoidable. Even Adams concedes that no antithetical discourse can be
wholly free of power criteria. Adams, Canons, supra note 6, at 758.
118. Cf P. DAVIES, supra note 77, at ix ("science offers a surer path to God
than religion."). See also B. RUSSELL, WHY I AM A CHRISTIAN (1940).
119. Einstein, quoted in P. DAVIES, supra note 77, at epigraph.
120. See, e.g., G. STEINER, supra note 4, at 132 (asserting that, on its own

premises, deconstruction is irrefutable).
121. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
122. See Adams, Canons, supra note 6, at 764.
123. Cf P. DAVIES, supra note 77, at 219 ('physics tells us what we can
know about the universe, not how it is") (quoting Niels Bohr) (emphasis in
original).
124. Cf Putnam, supra note 3, at 98 (suggesting that contradictory versions of an event might both be valid).
125. Quoted in E. ENGLAND, DIALOGUES WITH MYSELF: PERSONAL ESSAYS
ON MORMON EXPERIENCE ix (1984); accord, Adams, Freedom, supra note 102,
at 5 ("Without Contraries is no progression") (quoting Blake, The Marriage of
Heaven and Hell, in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND PROSE OF WILLIAM BLAKE 34

(D. Erdman ed. 1982)).

